Secretless CI/CD deployments (OIDC federation)
A GitHub Actions job deploys to the cloud with Terraform using its OIDC token, with no client secrets or access keys stored in the repository.
Problem
The pipeline needs credentials to deploy, and a key stored as a repo secret is the most exposed long-lived credential an organization has: it never expires on its own, gets copied across repos, and nobody knows who used it. Requirements: zero static secrets, trust scoped to one repository and one specific environment (not any branch or any repo in the org), least-privilege permissions on a scope, and tokens that last minutes.
The topology is the same on every cloud; what changes is what implements each role.
Federated trust
AWS
IAM OIDC identity provider
One per account for token.actions.githubusercontent.com; client_id_list = sts.amazonaws.com
Coming from Azure: there this role is Federated identity credential (workload identity federation).
Coming from GCP: there this role is Workload Identity Federation (pool + provider OIDC).
4 gotchas in this role
Azure
Federated identity credential (workload identity federation)
One per environment: GitHub issuer + exact subject + audience api://AzureADTokenExchange
Coming from AWS: there this role is IAM OIDC identity provider. There's no trust policy with wildcards: each environment, branch or tag is a credential with an exact subject, up to 20 per identity.
Coming from GCP: there this role is Workload Identity Federation (pool + provider OIDC). There's no CEL condition: each environment, branch or tag is a credential with an exact subject, up to 20 per identity.
4 gotchas in this role
- The subject must match exactly, with no wildcards, and there are at most 20 credentials per identity
- A freshly created credential can fail with AADSTS70021 for a few minutes
- Creating several credentials in parallel on the same identity returns 409
- Since 2026-07-15, new, renamed or transferred repos use a different sub format
Deployment identity
AWS
IAM Role
Trust policy: AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity with exact aud and sub (StringEquals)
Coming from Azure: there this role is User-assigned Managed Identity. The role bundles identity, trust (trust policy) and permissions; in Azure those are three separate objects. The trust policy allows StringLike, unlike a federated credential's exact match.
Coming from GCP: there this role is Service Account (impersonada).
2 gotchas in this role
Azure
User-assigned Managed Identity
No secrets or certificates; the workflow only knows client-id and tenant-id
Coming from AWS: there this role is IAM Role.
Coming from GCP: there this role is Service Account (impersonada).
No fine print in this role.
Least-privilege permissions
AWS
IAM policies attached to the role
Scoped managed policies; never AdministratorAccess
Coming from Azure: there this role is Azure RBAC.
Coming from GCP: there this role is IAM.
No fine print in this role.
Azure
Azure RBAC
One role assignment on the target resource group
Coming from AWS: there this role is IAM policies attached to the role.
Coming from GCP: there this role is IAM.
1 gotcha in this role
Amazon Web Services
Implementation
- Federated trust
- IAM OIDC identity providerOne per account for token.actions.githubusercontent.com; client_id_list = sts.amazonaws.comComing from Azure: there this role is Federated identity credential (workload identity federation).Coming from GCP: there this role is Workload Identity Federation (pool + provider OIDC).
- Deployment identity
- IAM RoleTrust policy: AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity with exact aud and sub (StringEquals)Coming from Azure: there this role is User-assigned Managed Identity. The role bundles identity, trust (trust policy) and permissions; in Azure those are three separate objects. The trust policy allows StringLike, unlike a federated credential's exact match.Coming from GCP: there this role is Service Account (impersonada).
- Least-privilege permissions
- IAM policies attached to the roleScoped managed policies; never AdministratorAccessComing from Azure: there this role is Azure RBAC.Coming from GCP: there this role is IAM.
Cost model
Scales to zero
No fixed cost
IAM and STS are free. You only pay for what the pipeline deploys.
Monthly floor with no traffic
USD 0/ mo
USD 0: no components with a fixed cost.
Fine print · 5 gotchas
IAM requires a sub condition, but accepts one that still leaves the door open
GitHub's issuer is the same for every organization: without scoping sub, any GitHub repository could assume your role. That's why IAM rejects creating or updating a trust policy for that provider when the sub (or job_workflow_ref) condition is missing or is just a wildcard. But "repo:*" or "repo:my-org/*" pass validation. The real boundary is yours to set: this module uses StringEquals with one sub per environment.
If the job declares an environment, the sub no longer contains the branch
GitHub includes the environment in the sub when the job references one; pull_request and the ref only appear if the job doesn't reference an environment. A job on main with environment production presents repo:org/repo:environment:production, so a trust policy expecting repo:org/repo:ref:refs/heads/main rejects AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity.
The session lasts 1 hour by default, and role chaining caps it at 1 hour regardless
AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity grants 3600 s by default; you can request up to the role's MaxSessionDuration (12 h max), and asking for more makes the call fail. If you assume another role from it (role chaining, common in multi-account), the session is capped at 1 hour. A long apply that runs past the limit fails mid-way with a half-written state.
There's only one OIDC provider per URL per account
Creating a second provider for token.actions.githubusercontent.com in the same account fails: IAM doesn't let you register the same URL twice in an account. If each repo ships its own Terraform stack with the provider inside, the second apply breaks. Create it once (in the account stack) and reference it with the data source; the module supports that with create_oidc_provider = false.
For GitHub, IAM doesn't use the thumbprint to verify (and you don't need to set it)
IAM validates GitHub's certificate against its library of trusted root CAs, so thumbprint_list is optional and, in the Terraform provider, for IdPs like GitHub it's stored but not used for verification. Thumbprints only come into play if the IdP uses a certificate not signed by one of those CAs, or if AWS can't retrieve the TLS certificate or TLS v1.3 is required.
Terraform
main.tf
# Despliegue desde CI sin secretos — AWS
#
# OIDC provider de GitHub (uno por cuenta) y un rol IAM cuya trust policy
# exige el audience de STS y un sub exacto por environment.
locals {
github_host = "token.actions.githubusercontent.com"
repo_path = var.github.owner_id == null ? "${var.github.owner}/${var.github.repository}" : "${var.github.owner}@${var.github.owner_id}/${var.github.repository}@${var.github.repository_id}"
# Si el job declara `environment:`, el sub es este (y no el de la rama).
subjects = sort([for env in var.environments : "repo:${local.repo_path}:environment:${env}"])
provider_arn = var.create_oidc_provider ? aws_iam_openid_connect_provider.github[0].arn : data.aws_iam_openid_connect_provider.github[0].arn
trust_conditions = {
StringEquals = {
"${local.github_host}:aud" = "sts.amazonaws.com"
"${local.github_host}:sub" = local.subjects
}
}
}
# Sin thumbprint_list: para GitHub, IAM valida el certificado contra su librería
# de CAs raíz y no usa el thumbprint (gotcha: thumbprint-not-used).
resource "aws_iam_openid_connect_provider" "github" {
count = var.create_oidc_provider ? 1 : 0
url = "https://${local.github_host}"
client_id_list = ["sts.amazonaws.com"]
}
data "aws_iam_openid_connect_provider" "github" {
count = var.create_oidc_provider ? 0 : 1
url = "https://${local.github_host}"
}
resource "aws_iam_role" "deploy" {
name = var.name
description = "GitHub Actions ${local.repo_path} (${join(", ", local.subjects)})"
max_session_duration = var.max_session_duration
assume_role_policy = jsonencode({
Version = "2012-10-17"
Statement = [{
Effect = "Allow"
Action = "sts:AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity"
Principal = { Federated = local.provider_arn }
Condition = local.trust_conditions
}]
})
}
resource "aws_iam_role_policy_attachment" "deploy" {
for_each = var.policy_arns
role = aws_iam_role.deploy.name
policy_arn = each.value
}variables.tf
variable "name" {
description = "Nombre del rol de despliegue (ej. \"deploy-web\")."
type = string
validation {
condition = can(regex("^[a-zA-Z0-9+=,.@_-]{3,64}$", var.name))
error_message = "name: 3-64 caracteres válidos para un rol IAM."
}
}
variable "region" {
description = "Región del provider (IAM es global)."
type = string
default = "us-east-1"
}
variable "create_oidc_provider" {
description = "Crear el OIDC provider de GitHub. Hay uno solo por URL y por cuenta: si ya existe, false y se referencia (gotcha: one-oidc-provider-per-account)."
type = bool
default = true
}
variable "github" {
description = <<-EOT
Repositorio que puede desplegar. owner_id y repository_id (numéricos) activan el formato inmutable del
claim sub ("repo:owner@123/repo@456:..."), que GitHub usa por defecto en repos creados, renombrados o
transferidos desde el 15/07/2026.
EOT
type = object({
owner = string
repository = string
owner_id = optional(number)
repository_id = optional(number)
})
validation {
condition = (var.github.owner_id == null) == (var.github.repository_id == null)
error_message = "github: owner_id y repository_id van juntos (formato inmutable) o ninguno de los dos."
}
}
variable "environments" {
description = "Environments de GitHub que pueden asumir el rol (match exacto con StringEquals)."
type = set(string)
default = ["production"]
validation {
condition = length(var.environments) >= 1 && alltrue([for e in var.environments : !can(regex("[*?]", e))])
error_message = "environments: al menos uno y sin comodines (el módulo usa StringEquals a propósito)."
}
}
variable "policy_arns" {
description = "Policies administradas que necesita el despliegue (mínimo privilegio)."
type = set(string)
validation {
condition = !contains(var.policy_arns, "arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/AdministratorAccess")
error_message = "policy_arns: AdministratorAccess no. Acotá los permisos a lo que despliega el pipeline."
}
}
variable "max_session_duration" {
description = "Duración máxima de la sesión en segundos (1 h a 12 h). Si el apply dura más que la sesión, falla a mitad de camino."
type = number
default = 3600
validation {
condition = var.max_session_duration >= 3600 && var.max_session_duration <= 43200
error_message = "max_session_duration: entre 3600 y 43200."
}
}
variable "tags" {
description = "Tags comunes."
type = map(string)
default = {}
}outputs.tf
output "role_arn" {
description = "role-to-assume para aws-actions/configure-aws-credentials (no es un secreto)."
value = aws_iam_role.deploy.arn
}
output "subjects" {
description = "Valores exactos de sub que acepta la trust policy."
value = local.subjects
}
output "workflow_snippet" {
description = "Fragmento mínimo del workflow."
value = <<-YAML
permissions:
id-token: write # sin esto el job no puede pedir el token OIDC
contents: read
jobs:
deploy:
environment: ${sort(tolist(var.environments))[0]}
steps:
- uses: aws-actions/configure-aws-credentials@v4
with:
role-to-assume: ${aws_iam_role.deploy.arn}
aws-region: ${var.region}
YAML
}versions.tf
terraform {
required_version = ">= 1.7.0"
required_providers {
aws = {
source = "hashicorp/aws"
version = "~> 6.67"
}
}
}
provider "aws" {
region = var.region
default_tags {
tags = var.tags
}
}Microsoft Azure
Implementation
- Federated trust
- Federated identity credential (workload identity federation)One per environment: GitHub issuer + exact subject + audience api://AzureADTokenExchangeComing from AWS: there this role is IAM OIDC identity provider. There's no trust policy with wildcards: each environment, branch or tag is a credential with an exact subject, up to 20 per identity.Coming from GCP: there this role is Workload Identity Federation (pool + provider OIDC). There's no CEL condition: each environment, branch or tag is a credential with an exact subject, up to 20 per identity.
- Deployment identity
- User-assigned Managed IdentityNo secrets or certificates; the workflow only knows client-id and tenant-idComing from AWS: there this role is IAM Role.Coming from GCP: there this role is Service Account (impersonada).
- Least-privilege permissions
- Azure RBACOne role assignment on the target resource groupComing from AWS: there this role is IAM policies attached to the role.Coming from GCP: there this role is IAM.
Cost model
Scales to zero
No fixed cost
Managed identities, federated identity credentials and role assignments are free. You only pay for what the pipeline deploys.
Monthly floor with no traffic
USD 0/ mo
USD 0: no components with a fixed cost.
Fine print · 5 gotchas
The subject must match exactly, with no wildcards, and there are at most 20 credentials per identity
In Azure trust isn't a policy: each federated identity credential is an issuer + subject pair that must match the token's sub character by character. There are no wildcards, so you need one credential per environment, branch or tag, capped at 20 per identity. In AWS or GCP you'd use StringLike or a CEL condition. Watch out: a wrong subject is created without error, and the failure only shows up at login.
With Contributor the pipeline can't create role assignments
Contributor does not allow assigning roles in Azure RBAC (it excludes Microsoft.Authorization/*/Write). If your Terraform assigns roles (say, an app's identity on a Key Vault), Contributor is not enough. The quick fix is giving the pipeline Owner or User Access Administrator, which is exactly what you don't want. The right fix is Role Based Access Control Administrator with a condition limiting which roles it can assign (and excluding privileged ones).
Since 2026-07-15, new, renamed or transferred repos use a different sub format
GitHub adds the numeric IDs to the claim: repo:org@123/repo@456:environment:prod instead of repo:org/repo:environment:prod, so a recycled name doesn't inherit the trust. Older repos keep the old format unless they opt in. If you rename a repo, the sub changes and every exact credential stops matching. The module builds the subject with IDs when you pass them.
A freshly created credential can fail with AADSTS70021 for a few minutes
The credential takes time to replicate across the region. If the same pipeline creates it and uses it right away, the token exchange can fail with "No matching federated identity record found for presented assertion" even though the subject is right. Microsoft recommends waiting and retrying. If bootstrap and the first deploy run together, split them or add a retry with backoff.
Creating several credentials in parallel on the same identity returns 409
Concurrent writes of federated identity credentials under the same user-assigned identity are rejected with 409 Conflict. The azurerm provider creates them serially since 3.40, so a for_each won't break. In ARM or Bicep, though, a loop creates them in parallel: use serial mode (batchSize 1) or chain dependsOn.
Terraform
main.tf
# Despliegue desde CI sin secretos — Azure
#
# User-assigned managed identity con un federated identity credential por
# environment de GitHub (match exacto de issuer + subject) y un único role
# assignment sobre el resource group destino.
data "azurerm_client_config" "current" {}
locals {
github_issuer = "https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com"
# Único audience aceptado por Entra ID para federated identity credentials.
audience = "api://AzureADTokenExchange"
repo_path = var.github.owner_id == null ? "${var.github.owner}/${var.github.repository}" : "${var.github.owner}@${var.github.owner_id}/${var.github.repository}@${var.github.repository_id}"
# Si el job declara `environment:`, el sub es este (y no el de la rama).
subjects = { for env in var.environments : env => "repo:${local.repo_path}:environment:${env}" }
}
resource "azurerm_resource_group" "identity" {
name = "rg-${var.name}-identity"
location = var.location
tags = var.tags
}
resource "azurerm_user_assigned_identity" "deploy" {
name = "id-${var.name}"
resource_group_name = azurerm_resource_group.identity.name
location = azurerm_resource_group.identity.location
tags = var.tags
}
# azurerm crea las credenciales de una misma identidad en serie (desde 3.40);
# en ARM/Bicep hay que forzarlo (gotcha: fic-concurrent-writes-409).
resource "azurerm_federated_identity_credential" "github" {
for_each = local.subjects
name = "github-${each.key}"
user_assigned_identity_id = azurerm_user_assigned_identity.deploy.id
issuer = local.github_issuer
audience = [local.audience]
subject = each.value
}
resource "azurerm_role_assignment" "deploy" {
scope = var.target_scope_id
role_definition_name = var.role_definition_name
principal_id = azurerm_user_assigned_identity.deploy.principal_id
principal_type = "ServicePrincipal"
description = "GitHub Actions ${local.repo_path} (${join(", ", sort(tolist(var.environments)))})"
}variables.tf
variable "name" {
description = "Prefijo para nombrar los recursos (ej. \"deploy-web\")."
type = string
validation {
condition = can(regex("^[a-z0-9-]{3,24}$", var.name))
error_message = "name: 3-24 caracteres, minúsculas, números o guiones."
}
}
variable "location" {
description = "Región de Azure de la identidad (no tiene que ser la de los recursos que despliega)."
type = string
default = "eastus2"
}
variable "github" {
description = <<-EOT
Repositorio que puede desplegar. owner_id y repository_id (numéricos) activan el formato inmutable del
claim sub ("repo:owner@123/repo@456:..."), que GitHub usa por defecto en repos creados, renombrados o
transferidos desde el 15/07/2026 (gotcha: github-sub-format-changed).
EOT
type = object({
owner = string
repository = string
owner_id = optional(number)
repository_id = optional(number)
})
validation {
condition = (var.github.owner_id == null) == (var.github.repository_id == null)
error_message = "github: owner_id y repository_id van juntos (formato inmutable) o ninguno de los dos."
}
}
variable "environments" {
description = "Environments de GitHub que pueden desplegar. Uno por federated identity credential (sin comodines)."
type = set(string)
default = ["production"]
validation {
# Máximo 20 credenciales por identidad (gotcha: fic-exact-match-max-20).
condition = length(var.environments) >= 1 && length(var.environments) <= 20
error_message = "environments: entre 1 y 20 (límite de federated identity credentials por identidad)."
}
validation {
condition = alltrue([for e in var.environments : !strcontains(e, "*")])
error_message = "environments: los federated identity credentials no admiten comodines."
}
}
variable "target_scope_id" {
description = "ID del scope donde despliega el pipeline (idealmente un resource group, no la suscripción)."
type = string
validation {
condition = can(regex("^/subscriptions/[^/]+/resourceGroups/[^/]+$", var.target_scope_id))
error_message = "target_scope_id: tiene que ser un resource group (/subscriptions/<id>/resourceGroups/<nombre>)."
}
}
variable "role_definition_name" {
description = "Rol sobre el scope. Contributor no puede crear role assignments (gotcha: contributor-cannot-assign-roles)."
type = string
default = "Contributor"
validation {
condition = !contains(["Owner", "User Access Administrator"], var.role_definition_name)
error_message = "role_definition_name: Owner y User Access Administrator no; si el pipeline asigna roles, usá un role assignment con condición aparte."
}
}
variable "tags" {
description = "Tags comunes."
type = map(string)
default = {}
}outputs.tf
output "client_id" {
description = "AZURE_CLIENT_ID para azure/login (no es un secreto)."
value = azurerm_user_assigned_identity.deploy.client_id
}
output "tenant_id" {
description = "AZURE_TENANT_ID para azure/login."
value = data.azurerm_client_config.current.tenant_id
}
output "subjects" {
description = "Subjects exactos que acepta cada credencial. Compará con el sub real del token si el login falla con AADSTS70021."
value = local.subjects
}
output "workflow_snippet" {
description = "Fragmento mínimo del workflow."
value = <<-YAML
permissions:
id-token: write # sin esto el job no puede pedir el token OIDC
contents: read
jobs:
deploy:
environment: ${sort(tolist(var.environments))[0]}
steps:
- uses: azure/login@v2
with:
client-id: ${azurerm_user_assigned_identity.deploy.client_id}
tenant-id: ${data.azurerm_client_config.current.tenant_id}
subscription-id: <subscription del scope>
YAML
}versions.tf
terraform {
required_version = ">= 1.7.0"
required_providers {
azurerm = {
source = "hashicorp/azurerm"
version = "~> 5.8"
}
}
}
provider "azurerm" {
features {}
# subscription_id se toma de ARM_SUBSCRIPTION_ID.
}